

GAME THEORY IN POLITICAL SCIENCE. THE PLAYFUL NATURE OF THE CULTURE OF POWER

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Introduction The implementation of game theory in political science makes it possible to systematize the past and present in the course of history and to project the strategic future of the culture of power. At the same time, expanding the boundaries of cognition of political roles, game theory occupies a special place in the development of models in the process of institutional foundations and institutions of the culture of power.

It is customary to study the political processes of transforming societies mainly with the help of game theory. For a better and more comprehensive analysis, it is believed to analyze the policy actors' behavior from the point of view of outcome management as well as the purpose of manipulating reality and also the tasks of subordinating the activities of existing socio-political institutions to group interests.

Summarizing the crises of political, and geopolitical developments, uncertainties and turbulences existing in post soviet transformable societies, there arose a question: Would it be preferable to overestimate the role of rational choice institutionalism as a game, especially formed by the applicability of rational choice theory. Indeed, they play an important role in modern political science, but there is no unified approach to them [Akhremenko, et al., 2015, 39-59]. Hence, it is necessary to re-evaluate the classical approaches to the correlation of politics and law in order to understand how the legal regulation of the most controversial issues affects the change in the balance of forces involved in the exercise of power in transforming societies. Historically, legal regulation is fundamentally contraindicated in any shadow form of transformation of state power. Politics identifies and strengthens the ways of social development, and the law determines, giving them a universal and legal appearance. Such a coincidence of the regulatory possibilities of politics and law makes it possible to free the culture of exercising power from internal antipsychotics, focusing on social coexistence [Margaryan, 2019, 203,204]. All this keeps public policy not only from the cruel extremes of the political

game but also forms the strategic thinking of the political elite in relation to radical changes. It is precisely the absence of such thinking that, marginalizing the socio-political order of countries in a democratic transition (including Armenia), and being tempted by the radical transformation of linear liberalization, the political elite ignores its function of social responsibility like Pierre Menard, the hero of Jorge Luis Borges, manages to rewrite Cervantes' novel "Don Quixote". Being the greatest expert on the development of game logic in the culture of exercising power through a literary text, Borges shows that Pierre Menard, however, makes a lot of effort, but after finishing his essay, discovers that the new novel he created copies the original one. However, 300 years have passed since the publication of Don Quixote, and the same words, images, language thinking and strategy of exercising power are perceived differently, therefore, the new novel could not be equivalent: people have changed over time, and with them the perception of the game politics of the culture of power has changed either.

Literature review Politics as a game in political science was first applied by representatives of the behaviorist school of the University of Chicago by Charles Merriam. H. Lasswell also has a great contribution to this theory to political science, and in his work, written jointly with Kaplan, documented: "The only thing inherent in all types of power is the influence on politics: How the effect occurs and on what grounds it is implemented is transient, but has a specific content"[Lasswell, 1962, 92]. At the same time by emphasizing the importance of having a power market H. Laswell justified the approach that everything that happens in the market is a game, the player wins with the rules, and the desire to win with a violation of the rules is punishable. According to behaviorists, the political market presupposes the motive and purpose of the actions of political actors, the speed of transformation, as well as a certain level of cognition and knowledge. With this approach, Downs, having developed the theory of Hotelling of economic variables of candidates' behavior to study the situation in political science, especially crises and risks that arose during elections, justified its application in political science [Downs, 1957, 25].

Methodology In the early 1960s, the American political scientist K. Deutsch developed the Globus format for modelling political activity, within the framework of which the provisions of cybernetic modeling of social communications and mobility in the political development and cultural textual variables of a given society were determined [Deutsch, 2008]. Since then, within the framework of the Globus format, a civilizational approach has been laid as the basis for modelling qualitative indicators of the culture of exercising power, with an emphasis on causal, behavioural, structural and functional methods of studying innovations that came to Armenia during the transformations. Nevertheless, the analysis of the political processes of post-Soviet transformable societies was carried out within the framework of game theories and rational

choice. But it should be noted that, having freed itself from the status of "pseudoscience" of Soviet times, the new developing political science not only failed to respond to the tough challenges of radical changes of the first line (linear liberalization, systemic privatization, individualism, rejection of traditional social institutions, mechanical westernization) that arose in transformed societies but also showed a very primitive approach to them. Moreover, as a result of the crises of political development, the political elite has not developed a strategy to combat widespread poverty, exclusion, marginalization, corruption and emigration. Nevertheless, the variables of the game approach have continued to be implemented on the basis of rational choice theory, namely: Since the days of Downs [Downs, 1957, 28] until now, it has played a central role in political research, but is subjected to a sharp [Bojme, 1999, 502]. Especially, the approach is being revised, according to which the complexity of the political system and processes is due to individual sellers and buyers pursuing their unfounded interests. organizations (parties) consisting of groups of "selfish individuals" who pursue a strategy of obtaining maximum utility. However, it is precisely this practice that underlies the culture of exercising power by transforming societies, according to which each player has an alternative strategy that he uses in order to maximize profits. The individualistic approach in close combination of modern political science with political economy develops the idea of microfoundations "(MIFs)". This plays a crucial role in Acemoglu and J. Robinson's modelling methodology. With the latter's approach, according to game theory, people not only build their behavior according to their preferences but also interact with each other [Acemoglu, et al., 2009, 434]. The choice of strategy by the players takes into account the response to the possible actions of the counterparty. The player, from the point of view of other players, chooses the best (most useful) answer from the best. This is an objective approach to game theory, but, on the other hand, the unified use of game theory and the rational choice paradigm is formal. Meanwhile, it is necessary that the study of models should be aimed at the application of analytical solutions (analytical tractability). The above allows us to conclude that the joint use of game theory and the paradigm of rational choice has great alternative possibilities for modeling both individual (group) and social value systems. Since 1995, summing up the consequences of the mechanical transformation of political elites in a constant crisis of the legitimacy of power, the UN has developed the principles of "Good Governance" for "running / reaching" countries (in order to improve the quality of democratization of the public policy system), distinguishing, but not contrasting the concepts of "Management" and "Governance". Thus, the concept of "Governance" is a set of pre-developed policies and procedures of responsibility and experience, which is used to develop ways to ensure strategic directions, achieve goals, accountable use of available data and risk management. The concept of "management" is the process of market planning, regulation, management, and control of various resources (human, financial, physical and informa-

tional) of any organization to achieve its goals. If the concept of "Governance" includes the purposeful execution of correctly designed actions, then "management" is the correct execution of correctly designed actions [Margaryan, 2014].

Therefore, it should be taken into account that the study and use of game theory in modern developments of political science, due to its multilevel argumentation, definitely cannot be used unless its priority strategic importance for this "running / reaching" country is clarified. Nevertheless, the priority of the applicability of game theory from the point of view of the culture of the exercise of power and the functioning of political institutions in modernizing societies in the "Running/reaching" model should be justified by the following proposals.

1. Is it possible to consider political power and the culture of exercising power only at the micro level? Is it possible to ignore the functional disorders that have arisen as a result of the linear liberalization of social and political institutional structures in the axiology of public interest and coexistence, as well as the selective quality of the political elite?

2. Is it possible to generalize the patterns of functioning of a democratic political system by multiple strategic interactions of individuals (mainly old and new leaders), ignoring the process of transition from democratic to consolidation?

3. Is it possible to create endogenous institutions? Overcoming (artificially created) communication gaps between the interests of society and the challenges of consolidation.

4. Is it possible to simulate changes in people's behavior with the help of a rapid change of socio-political institutions and at the same time create a "strategy framework saturated with various psychological combinations" of regulating behaviour on demand and by consciousness [Page, 2020, 72]?

Analysis *How to use game theory in analyzing changes in the culture of implementing power*

According to the expert, from the point of view of legislation, marriages with minors are pedophilia, for which management and monitoring of results are imprisoned. At the same time, analyzing the political processes of developing countries, it should be stated that according to game theory, a conflict situation (especially an interethnic one that prevents turbulence) cannot be imagined and solved only by mathematical modelling. Game theory is designed to develop in its mathematical, logical, cultural, and geopolitical texts of hermeneutics proposals for the choice of rational actions for recurring conflict situations. With the help of game theory, it is possible to really predict the presence of random variables in the behaviour of conflicting parties or the possibility of a quick change of sides [Diksit, et al., 2019, 19]. Hence, D. Rosenau proposed a new approach, according to which the internal and foreign policy of the state is correctly

based on an objective change in the value indicators of international relations in the first place, but the state is obliged to harmoniously analyze its policy based on public interests. It was obvious from D. Rosenau's approach that in the same political situation, the objects of research can be large social groups, political institutions, political communications and politicians [Tsigankov, 2023, 214]. In fact, considering political games as a variable of the culture of exercising power, it should be taken into account. Firstly, the purpose and motives of political activity may coincide, ensuring the viability of the goal. However, achieving goals does not imply that staying in the game should be an end in itself on the part of politicians. Secondly, in political activity, it is wrong to accept victory and defeat as absolute. Thirdly, a politician, accepting the game as a component of the political process, rationalizes all levels of his activity. In the conditions of the absolutization of these characteristics, such closely interrelated technologies as manipulation, bluff, and post-truth are effectively used in political games. It is only with their systematic use that competitive, capable, skillful politicians fighting for their own country can artificially mislead their opponents and influence them. Thanks to these influences, they either pull the opponent to their side, or oust him from the political struggle, or they themselves submit to the opposite side, becoming an expression of their interests. That is why manipulation, bluff, and post-truth occupy a special place in the culture of exercising power. Nevertheless, in this complex process, bluff as a theatrical form of manifestation of the illusion of reality is crucial, because with its help, the opponent, from whom they intend to take away power, initiative, success, through the dissemination of incorrect information, falls into apologetic shock. A classic example in this sense, fascist Germany concluded a non-aggression treaty with the USSR, despite the fact that it had already developed Barbarossa's plan - to seize the country with lightning speed [Neumann, et al., 1970, 210]. According to von Neumann, it is impossible to win without bluffing: in order to achieve the goal, it is necessary to increase the bet several times and convince the opponent that you have excellent cards and it is impractical to raise the bet. In fact, in zero-sum games (a strategic equivalent game with a constant result), it is advisable to enter information about the next step so that the opponent does not guess and cannot respond with an optimal strategy. A mixed strategy involves choosing a pure strategy using random numbers (randomization).

In this context, real information is often manipulated in applicability. Let's say the enemy accidentally receives (gets) information about your capabilities. For example, Israel signaled a special dose of information (signaling), that is, missed the opportunity to have an atomic bomb. In political science, Jeffrey Banks specifically addressed such an analysis of games: an informed player receiving information from player B develops three strategies: believe in this information, disbelieve and try to distinguish real from false, and ignore or suppress the information. It is advisable to trust the information of player A, which is manifested in his actions, but player A, seeing the intellectual capabi-

lities of another, can imitate his own actions for the purpose of deception [Banks, 1991]. The military calls it reconnaissance in combat, partisans "checking roads" and detecting suspicious recruits. Obviously, all these structural elements are effective if the political bluff is structured logically, and politicians can skillfully use only the information they have and, like a magician, influence the psychology of the opponent (audience). From this point of view, we dare to assert that manipulation, bluff, and post-truth are components of professional modelling of the culture of exercising power. Consequently, politicians, in order to prevent or create chaos, influence various instincts of the masses, while simultaneously developing a policy of self - defense, pleasure, national security, social responsibility, the collapse of old stereotypes, the spread of fake news, the creation of new myths, the multidimensional value of perception and thinking. Consequently, political games conducted within the framework of the culture of exercising power and power relations are mostly hidden or theatrical. Moreover, the accumulated experience of history shows that the political game is unique in that the players mostly do not play by the rules. Speaking about the game development of the culture of the game and the exercise of power, Haising clearly shows his fertility in the emergence of all major forms of life, justifying the idea of the irrefutable existence of the game: "All abstract ideas can be refuted: law, beauty, Truth, Kindness, spirit, God. Is it possible to deny the seriousness. The game cannot be played". At the same time, from the point of view of the meaning of the game, Haising writes. "... a game is a voluntary action or activity that takes place within the boundaries established in time and space, voluntarily accepted, but absolutely mandatory according to the rules, having its own purpose in itself, accompanied by a sense of tension and joy and awareness of the "other", different from "ordinary life" [Haising, 2007, 46]. Defining the political game in this context as a set of modeled actions, relations, information and communication technologies, one should not forget about political turbulence in the global and global space, which by its nature is a kind of game to influence the culture of the exercise of power of various states and the identity of members of society. It is in this regard that politics is unpredictable, because in such a political game, shadow phenomena (internal and external political ties, influences) are behind the institutional players -the leader and his team. Summarizing the above, we can conclude that the analysis of the culture of the exercise of power in political processes with the help of game theory is a strategic problem for each country, as such, for decision-making with its help, those essential factors are identified that, influencing the processes, allow analyzing and evaluating the culture of power in authenticity, generalizing the adopted decision strategy for goal and result management. Therefore, it should be considered that with the help of decision-making processes, it is possible to determine the axiogenicity of the purposeful activity of the culture of exercising power by the governing class. It's obvious when former leaders in their memoirs, books, and interviews reveal brackets, highlighting the following main elements

of the game of political decision-making: political tricks, intrigues, behind-the-scenes conspiracies, deals, personnel, agenda, text manipulation. Hence, the importance of mechanisms for the development of a culture of exercising power through political play is unique in that the rules established at a certain time are transformed depending on the situation and the skills of the player. History shows that predictable and unpredictable transformations change all the rules of the game. It is in this sense that politics is an unpredictable game [Toynbee, 1979]. For this purpose, the culture of implementing power, including a set of actions, relationships, communication, and information technologies, is designed by institutional modeling of the value system of political players to either ensure normal development, or unpredictably change reality, or increase or decrease uncertainty and turbulence. Various models are used in the study of political processes caused by actors of the culture of exercising power (social groups, socio-political institutions, political leaders, the ruling class, humanists and inhumane individuals with unpredictable behavior). In this area, it is noteworthy that Tsch. Deleuze and F. Guatari, analyzing a person with revolutionary unfounded behavior opposing capitalist society, put forward the concept of "schizophrenia" in his theory of rhizomes. Hence, those people who not only refuse to bring their desires in line with the requirements of society and standard norms, showing unreasonable ambitions, begin to illusorily change reality with their sick imagination and "create reality" and convince of the need for this reality. According to Foucault, the non-conformity of the madman's discourse to the form of discourse accepted by the majority is being qualified as discourse) and it says: "...it lacks specific limitations, in other words, there is no clear assessment of reality, but the meaning of the word is healthier seems sounder than that of sane people." To represent the society of his dreams, Cervantes, as the main player, creates the image of a mad knight-Don Quixote, from whose mouth he voices his highest ideals, boundless devotion to humanity. His ridiculous behaviour, full of adventures, makes no sense, but it is not at all doubtful of the purity of his idea. "... and according to the words of the stranger, and by the image of the merchants guessed that he had gone mad", but well, "madness overcomes all arguments".

Why is it necessary to interpret the culture of power implementation with the help of the development of game theory?

The first reason is the necessity to predict the events that took place in political life because the unofficial network information flows (latent) have increased in parallel with the official information. Game theory helps to reveal the content of such informal information (latent) flows. Secondly, formal models have another advantage: their system functions can operate at a higher level and complexity. Naturally, today there is no unified concept in game theory to correspond to all types of games. This is primarily due to the fact that the official description of the game is only a general example des-

cription of the extremely complex real processes that take place during the game. For example, the exchange of information between politicians, possible agreements between them, and independent actions of politicians according to the framework of their awareness. Of course, we cannot exclude the fact of illogical behavior (steps) of the players or the case of emergency situations: it is impossible to make predictions in the current conditions of uncertainty and turbulence.

New approaches to modelling global political games are built on the natural results of previous experience. For example, American authors V. Jones and S. Rozin, considering different options of global strategies, justified *maximalist; minimalistic and reformative* projects.

Maximalists, taking the ideas of the American Constitution as a starting point, propose to have a world federal government, which implies a limitation of the sovereignty of national governments in developing areas. According to some authors, the maximal government program is not only difficult to implement, but it is also undesirable because it is possible for the player to overestimate his own opportunities (or take advantage of others' interests) and thereby it may increase uncertainties.

Minimalists believe that the pursuit of world order requires the centralization of world power to prevent war. Centralization of power is proposed only to implement the idea of global security. V. Jones and S. Rosen criticizing "minimalist" proposals, state that the world order should be based on universal values acceptable to all states, and not imposed, even through military operations, on the imposition of a new situation.

The main idea of the *reformers* is globalism. In this context, it was designed to enhance the role of the United Nations as the center of the idea of international planning. There are five main problems, the solution of which must be transferred to the global level: *ecology, ensuring the standard of living, preventing unemployment both globally and locally, urbanization, and world hunger.*

These problems, according to the "reformers", can be solved through comprehensive planning, infrastructure development and the distribution of global production. Summarizing the analysis of different global strategies, V. Jones and S. Rozin concluded that rational choice in decision-making with the parallel use of game theory can be both positive and negative for players only if the Pareto principle (80/20 Rule) is applied. According to V. Jones and S. Rozin, it will be possible to achieve 80% of the result in each situation and promote rational choice while following Pareto principles:

1. *Make a to-do list having the exact right order of steps.*
2. *Identify one to three most important tasks, and focus on it.*
3. *Find out the patterns of self-efficacy*

4. *Focus on the tasks that have priority.* This is the most important rule to avoid procrastination.

5. *Move on to the secondary tasks after completing the primary ones.*

Secondary tasks can be done in several approaches or combined into one complete task and completed using, for example, *The Pomodoro Technique*. The definition of the following two concepts about possible outcomes is interesting:

A "*weak Pareto optimum*", is a possible outcome that cannot improve all players at once, even by coordinating their moves.

A "*strong Pareto optimum*" is an outcome that cannot be improved for one player without making another player worse off.

However, decisions are often made under conditions of uncertainty, when it is impossible to unequivocally assess the probabilities of potential outcomes.

This occurs when the situation is multi-layer turbulent. Nevertheless, the possibility of changing the strategy at every moment, discovering new solutions, and predicting the behavior of competitors gives the possibility to make a rational decision. For a comprehensive study of this complex and open-layered process, theorists propose the most famous puzzle, the Prisoner's Dilemma, where players, with their cooperative and non-cooperative approaches, rationalize reality according to Nash equilibrium and Pareto-optimality. This game is based on the story of two suspected (pay attention: suspected) criminals. This two-dimensional matrix presents four possible punishment options: an optimal agreement option (both remain silent), a "*balanced*" conflict option (both confess), and a win-lose option where one suspect gains at the expense of the other (one confesses, and the other remains silent).

Usually, the strategy of confessing prevails for both suspects, resulting in a conflict resolution (both are being sentenced to five years in prison). The challenge here is to ensure that the players resist the temptation to confess (which both suffer as a result) and remain silent in order to achieve a mutually rational outcome. To do this, in addition to trusting each other, they need to critically assess their own desires. Therefore, the researchers of "Prisoner's Dilemma" posed the following question: What are the consequences of the alternative strategies that players use in repeated games or interactions? Axelrod gave the answer to the question during his systematic study of the prisoner's reciprocal move dilemma game.

According to Axelrod, although there is no optimal strategy, "an eye for an eye" approach (exact repetition of steps) is a long-term strategy for players, which basically gives the player the following two signals: We are here for a stable business relationship, but we are not going to concede our interests and sovereignty. Therefore, with the help

of game matrices with different states of equilibrium (with the option of minimizing/maximizing damages) in different situations, in addition to the structure of the situation, researchers have introduced a number of variables to indicate the choice influence of this or that behaviour: the number and value of game moves, communication opportunities, the choice of the opposite side, responding, sequential or simultaneous steps and assessment of the situation.

It is obvious that public interest Games enable the Government to participate in guided decision-making process under *conditions of uncertainty and controversy*. The uncertainty in this case may be caused not only by the opponents' efforts to hide their own actions but also by the informational incompleteness of the analysis of political situations. It should be noted that at a certain level of the dynamic political economy operating in the structure of the game theory, the problems of the standard approach have been overcome, first of all, when the transition of the system's dynamic behavior was described in particular.

Giving the theoretical and applied justification of this approach within the framework of this hypothesis D. Acemoglu separates the dependence of dynamic linkage from the time dimension.

The approach requires a reasoned response. The hypothesis should justify whether it is possible to implement a political process through purely game thinking or whether it is also necessary to ensure the quality of the activities of general political institutions.

This approach implies not only substantiating the exclusivity of game theory equipped with mathematical formulas but also clarifying the ideological bases of politics and the value system of the culture of exercising power, as well as accounting for constitutional principles and behavioral features.

According to the above mentioned, we should mention the principles of the institutional theory of the game approach (especially rational institutionalism) that institutions as structures that determine the "rules of the game" in their meaning have a concrete manifestation of the strategy of many players. From that point of view, by providing a feedback loop, the change in institutions leads to a change in the behavior of the actors in their own interests and benefits. Therefore, in terms of the culture of exercising power, game theory has a special approach to assessing the quality of institutions. The main idea of that approach is the combination of the "*Nash equilibrium*" and the realistically applied "*Pareto optimality*" (normative, desirable), through which maximum conditions are ensured for the provision of the common good.

According to the rational behavior of the players, the "Nash equilibrium" is a cooperation/non-complementary situation, and the "Pareto-optimal" is the equilibrium of the cooperative behaviors of the two players. Such inconsistency is the result of "bad"

functioning institutions. By changing the law, affecting the payoff matrix, we can achieve a change in behavior combining Nash and Pareto-optimal equilibrium. The latter will also be a sample of a "good/quality" institution.

Notably, highlighting the use of similar logic the American political scientists Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow in their "The Logic of Political Survival" developed and presented a special theory that suggested a possibility to generalize the operation of political institutions, in other words, the quality of their governance, without originally focusing on democracy or dictatorship. According to the authors, the players responsible for the process of ensuring the quality of management of political institutions were residents - N (residents) - N^* , The nominal selectorate, they are registered voters), *selectorate* - S , *leadership or the leader* (L), *challengers* - C , *winning coalition* - W , standards of loyalty (W/S).

Residents are those who operate in one of the polities. Residents are divided into two groups: those who join the selectorate and those who do not.

The commonality of the members of the selectorate is that they have the right of the guaranteed vote by the state during the election of the leader. Still, their main immanence is the opportunity to be included in the winning coalition without using the chance to be a member of the selectorate. Historically, the selectorate generally includes a small (sometimes even very small) number of residents. Residents not included in the structure of the selectorate are separated from it by various criteria (origin, religion, professional affiliation, wealth, gender, etc.). A key concept in the theory of selection is the winning coalition, which "... has diverse selectorate groups, which are present both in the political power and in other segments of society". The government supports the winning coalition. The dimensions of the winning coalition differ depending on the characteristics of the time and the country.

With these considerations, the authors emphasized that the Communist Party of Vietnam needs 3% of the population and only a fraction of that 3% for the leaders to maintain their power. By specifically highlighting the *rigged electoral system* (the existence of which was particularly evident in the USSR), the authors are sure that they are creating artificial qualities, especially by encouraging formal membership in the political parties supporting these systems. In this context, the loyalty standard is the ratio between the winning coalition and the selectorate and it has decisive importance for the political figure. To understand this, first of all, it's necessary to determine what it means to lead (leadership, leader) and who a candidate is.

A leader is anyone who has a winning plan and implements a certain policy, having the power *to collect taxes and spend public funds*, using it both for the general welfare and for private purposes.

Candidates are all those individuals or groups of individuals who try to replace the incumbent leader by proposing new mechanisms for *collecting taxes and spending public funds*, hoping to take over the government.

The goal of change is to increase the quality of government. It can only be achieved if the ratio of loyalty standards (W/S) is maintained, excluding the reduction of the space of W and the mechanical expansion of S. If the space of the coalition is small and the electorate is large, then we are dealing with authoritarian rule and formal elections. In fact, with the help of the development of a fundamentally new categorical apparatus, the authors studied and analyzed the influence of institutions on the selection institutions, the decisions made by the selected leader, as well as the decision-making as a game process within the framework of the "*selectorate theory*". In this context, theorists of the "*selectorate theory*" focusing on the desired outcomes for the players, raise an important question: How do the parties make optimal choices, when the possibilities of these choices depend on their awareness, consciousness, as well as "strategies and negotiation practices that lead to a particular outcome". Following this logic, the size (part) of the *selectorate*, that is, the number of actors who influenced or can influence the choice of the leader and the winning coalition, is of decisive importance.

An important component of this scheme is *the culture of implementing the power* of the actors at different levels. It is assumed that they are interested in their own self-realization and hence they improve their efficiency coefficient, *valuing their opportunities to appear in reality and the possibility of staying there long and not having reality and not their possibilities of having reality*.

Only in this case, it is possible to overcome (reduce) the uncertainty, assess the quality of the institution and consider that good/quality institutions are only those institutions whose actors, under the conditions of rational behavior, not only contribute the most to the provision of public good but also those that provide public good rationally in the face of large deviations in behavior. This characteristic phenomenon of the implementation of power was called *a scale for measuring stability to fluctuations*.

It should be taken into account that the scale of measuring stability to fluctuations characterizes the extent to which institutions are able to maintain efficiency in the conditions of "bad" political actors. In this context, it concludes, "We emphasize that W is not typical for democracy. Rather, W is one of the important characteristics of governance that helps distinguish democratic governance from other forms of governance, especially those characterized by small winning coalitions interacting with the electorate in various ways. Note that the most serious discrepancy between the victorious coalition and democracy is more than visible in comparison with the partial autocratic system. The approach is justified by giving the example of *Singapore* done by *Lee Kuan Yew* (1965 – 2000), when W's index scored 0.75 (coalition index) and only 0.40 scored on

Democracy. And when *Chiang Kai-shek* (1949-1972) was ruling authority in *Taiwan*, these indicators respectively were 0, 25 and 0,10.

Considering the dominance of the first over the second, we can conclude that public interests and interests in government programs dominate the Democracy index, which contributes to the implementation of a more responsible and less corrupt policy. In this context, the opposition of authoritarianism and democracy is excluded in the leadership interpretation mechanisms. Moreover, it is an overarching problem to present the concrete functioning of institutions by placing the *stable constant* at their base (public interest, security, coexistence) determining the maximum limit of admissibility of inequality. For this purpose, it is necessary to emphasize the targeted redistribution of resources of the social system as a result not only of political competition but also of the socio-political responsibility of different actors.

Further clarifying the developments on the basis of the proposed model, we can assume that the greater the socio-political responsibility of any actor as an investment (compared to the investments of other actors), the greater his probability of receiving public support as a superior resource. The efficiency of the system depends in particular on how the resource is distributed among the relatively efficient actors.

Thus, if one of the actors has a political advantage over the competitor, how much will be the resource received by him over others? In one system, the winner gets everything, or nearly everything, and the loser gets nothing.

In other more egalitarian societies the "*rules of the game*" are made up in a way that the losing candidate receives a significant share of public resources during redistribution. It should be taken into account that political economists characterize such "*redistributive egalitarianism*" as compared to autocracy saturated with formal democracy. Societies with more egalitarian "rules of the game" are less productive than those with inequality, but they also have free competition and greater potential for innovative development.

The approach that reveals the efficiency of the system assumes the following three factors: the quality of productivity of the actors, the functioning institutions (with specified functions in the given case), the actors' political strategists, and the creation of frameworks for these political strategies (which can sometimes also be called politicians). Institutional characteristics of these persistent factors include limiting inequality by developing targeted redistribution laws of public resources.

Thus, during the distribution of public goods, politicians (compared to others) receive a greater profit than their investments, if in the required period they are able to professionally activate both *manipulation*, *bluff* and *post-truth technologies*, with the professional modelling of the culture of the exercise of power. In order to justify the

limits of admissibility of this logic, it is necessary to specify *the level of legitimacy of the political-economic space of politicians*. Within the framework of this model, there is a need of political figures (within the framework of certain institutions) who will contribute to the normal modernization of the socio-political system with their activities. Within the framework of what has been said, the more such politicians, the more reliable (quality) the institutions are to fluctuations (instabilities/uncertainties) and they quickly overcome emergency situations.

Highlighting the issue of immunity to fluctuations in the quality of institutions, the order of distribution implies the maximum possible amount of resources given to one politician, which guarantees the relationship between political stability and sustainable development. In this context, the game model will look like this: each of the two actors (players) is obliged to solve a certain optimization problem by combining Nash equilibrium and Pareto optimality. Therefore, emphasizing the thesis based on the reliability of the institutions (in this case, the rules of resource distribution), they get the opportunity to increase the quality of the *functioning/functionalization of the institutions*.

In this model, the distributive law includes the definition of the maximum permissible degree of economic inequality, which determines the value system of the culture of the politician's exercise of power. This raises the question of under what conditions do societies with more egalitarian "*rules of the game*" become more reliable, and under what conditions do they become less reliable? Moreover, if the average economic efficiency of the actors is quite low, then for the normal modernization of that system, it is not enough for the more active actor (politician) to receive more resources than the one with low activity.

It is also necessary for the active politician to realize (focus attention on) his social responsibility function by getting the opportunity to manage the maximum part of the public resources. Therefore, if the criterion of the quality of institutions is the harmonization of political stability and sustainable development, then the quality of the culture of democracy in the implementation of power implies a real and non-game application of social responsibility in favor of public coexistence and democratic consolidation.

Conclusions To summarize:

1. In the structure of political science, it is necessary to carry out socio-political processes with two analyses of the game: situational and strategic. In the first case, the game is a situational action aimed at the reproduction of social experience or the accelerated transformation of the value system of people's behavior. In the second case, there is a special type of strategic activity, aimed at the long-term socialization of a person through cognition and epistemology, as well as the systematic analysis of the links of communicative past-present experience in the structure of the culture of the exercise of power and the development of a strategy for the future.

2. In the process of democratic transition and consolidation in the structure of political science, the mathematical anthropological, sociological, public-political, information-communication, and biopolitical approaches related to the nature of games and their effectiveness are especially important today. In this multidimensionality, the game practice of the culture of exercising power is determined by the analysis of the specifics of the evolutionary development of the given society. The process of introducing the game into public political life not only modernizes its level of civilization but also increases creative possibilities and resistance to external and internal sectional games.

3. The culture of implementation of power including the complex process of socio-political transformations implies public discourse and consolidation of the elite, or vice versa - monologue and the breakdown of social strata.

4. In fact, value-wise, games provide an opportunity to analyze the goal-oriented dynamics of the value-benefit system of actors in political processes, according to the institutional quality of the exercised power.

5. Game modelling of political processes is manifested through the democratization of the culture of political conflict management, negotiation, consultation and exercise of power. In this context, in the process of conducting political negotiations, a strategy of harmonizing the rational and the irrational is developed. At the same time, the consultation is being built on the assessment of individual (or group) activity and on the prediction of the development of the political situation.

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Game theory in political science. The playful nature of the culture of power

Key words: game theory, political science, culture of power, political role, balance of forces

Politics identifies and strengthens the ways of social development, and the law determines, giving them a universal and legal appearance. Such a coincidence of the regulatory possibilities of politics and law makes it possible to free the culture of exercising power from internal antipsychotics, focusing on social coexistence [Margaryan, 2019, 203,204]. All this keeps public policy not only from the cruel extremes of the political game but also forms the strategic thinking of the political elite in relation to radical changes. It is precisely the absence of such thinking that, marginalizing the socio-political order of countries in a democratic transition (including Armenia), and being tempted by the radical transformation of linear liberalization, the political elite ignores its function of social responsibility like Pierre Menard, the hero of Jorge Luis Borges, manages to rewrite Cervantes' novel “Don Quixote”. Being the greatest expert on the development of game logic in the culture of exercising power through a literary text, Borges shows that Pierre Menard, however, makes a lot of effort, but after finishing his essay, discovers that the new novel he created copies the original one. However, 300 years have passed since the publication of Don Quixote, and the same words, images, language thinking and strategy of exercising power are perceived differently, therefore, the new novel could not be equivalent: people have changed over time, and with them the perception of the game politics of the culture of power has changed either.