ISSUES OF INCREASING THE RESPONSIBILITY OF PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNANCE OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA: TRIPARTISM

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Introduction From the study of the activities of the coalition government of the Republic of Armenia, it is obvious that the low level of parliamentary control and socio-political response delayed the process from democratic transition to consolidation, deepening the inherent uncertainty, marginality, alienation and the possibility of revolutions. To study this multidimensional phenomenon on the basis of a scientific and analytical paradigm, we consider it necessary to carry out a value evolution of the activities of the Coalition Government of the Republic of Armenia, emphasizing the importance of institutional transformations aimed at democratic transition to consolidation. This will enable a reduction of uncertainty in the process of socio-political transformation, prevent marginality and alienation, and increase social responsibility.

Methodology Taking into account the multilevel nature of the topic we study, we consider it appropriate to apply a synergetic and functional-structuralist methodology within the framework of the principles of the scientific and analytical paradigm**.** In this section, from the point of view of expanding the responsibility of the coalition government, we consider the conclusion of a political agreement or pact possible in the context of the institutional implementation of the policy of tripartism. Since the formation of the first Coalition Government in 2003 up to this day, the pact as an institutional tool for consolidating public interests has almost always been ignored in both the legislative and executive branches, which led to the formation of "minimum-winning" coalitions. And "minimum winning" coalitions have shifted political accountability of their activities to the field of latently concluded informal political and economic relations. That is, each winning force "feeds" its electorate: neglecting public coexistence, it implements policies of monopoly and superprofits. Hence, the situational manifestation of the culture of exercising power not only causes a constant threat of revolutionization of an already marginalized society but also ignores the need for a pact of social coexistence.

Literature review Taking such values of political reality as a starting point, this article is based on such thinkers as K. Arrow, J. Gortney, J. Linz and A. Stepan, [K.

Arrow 2004, J. Gwartney and R. Stroup 1999, J. Linz and A. Stepan 1996] who attach great importance to social responsibility within the framework of the paradoxes of public choice. The analysis of this complex process from the standpoint of political economy is primarily important for determining the level of political freedom and the capacity of a deputy who has entered parliament. At the same time, it also assumes the value of communication-based on feedback from the electorate, the content of socio-political relations, as well as balancing party and public interests. In this respect, the efficiency of the legislative activity of newly elected members of parliament who entered the parliament is primarily due to the value content of socio-political communication with the electorate. Thus, for the correct use of organizational capabilities in the process of democratic transition, ensuring the proportionate use of resources and opportunities, and the introduction of more efficient mechanisms in the field of social partnership, the preferred form of cooperation is tripartite social dialogue - tripartism. The development of the traditions of socio-political partnership forming a tripartite format of cooperation dates back to the 1950s-60s of the 20th century, when in order to increase the responsibility of the authorities in European countries, a tripartite cooperation of governing (legislative, executive), business elites and trade unions began to form. The International Labor Organization, through the policy of tripartism, tried to develop social dialogue, process ways of natural modernization, take advantage of the opportunities of globalization, and prevent uncertainties arising in the floating spaces of the "global village", "global city", "outskirts", "center". According to the International Labour Organization (ILO), the promotion of tripartism will help to overcome such challenges as reducing income inequality, creating a legislative framework of institutional order aimed at increasing the efficiency of opportunities for workers of vulnerable groups, as well as increasing the responsibility of both governing (legislative, executive) and business elites and trade union organizations. It must be noted that accountability is also specified in the minimum definition of democracy, which, in addition to a secret ballot and universal suffrage, also includes the responsibility of the Government. However, since we are considering the tripartism functioning in the process of democratic transition to consolidation, it is impossible to talk about a coalition government without social dialogue and socio–ethnocultural aspects of exercising power.

New waves of innovation and digitisation of information and communication technologies have fundamentally transformed and will still transform the institutional foundations of management and the value system of managing the work environment [Report, 2018]. Governing (legislative, executive), business elites and trade union organizations are facing new challenges, which require new institutional changes [Hayter, 2015]. Evidently, the new technological progress and flexible socio-political interactions have created new challenges for regular modernization. The circulating concept of the "welfare state" is based on the creation of an accessible education and health system, the

implementation of social insurance programs, minimum wages and other programs aimed at reforming the sector [International Enciclopedia]. Hence, tripartism is implemented in all those countries where the states declare their social-oriented policies and pursue the solution of issues requiring social responsibility through tripartism. In fact, the determining factor of tripartism is to increase the responsibility of the governing (legislative, executive), business elites and trade union organizations through a multi-level discourse aimed at regular modernization of public interests. According to Ju Habermas, to popularize the discourse, it is necessary to form a platform for discussing issues of public interest and to ensure a real consensus:

➢ Provide all interested participants with the opportunity to engage in the discourse,

➢ All participants of the discourse should have a real opportunity to present their viewpoints, substantiate them, and conduct a dialogue with another person,

➢ The honesty factor is of paramount importance in the discourse, that is, all participants are faithful in their "inner world", in their feelings, relationships, and intentions,

➢ The viewpoints of the participants should not be influenced by the "external constraints" of reality, social status, or ratings of various groups and citizens [Linde, 2016, 55-56].

Analysis The key importance of socio-political multidimensional discourse is indisputable in all kinds of relationships, and tripartism can play a decisive role here for democratic consolidation. Consequently, tripartism, including the transition to relations of socio-political responsibility, is based on the principles of political democracy and market economy, which are based on the political and civil freedom of the participants.

One of the main stakeholders of tripartism are trade unions, and the intended goals of trilateral cooperation are realized provided the state shows political will and representatives of the business elite are ready to exercise social responsibility, denying super profit and monopoly. The efficiency of tripartism is determined by the capabilities of the partnership participants and the motivations and objectives of their cooperation. We believe that to implement tripartism, it is essential to accurately define certain rights, form corporate governance models, and, as a result, have *transparency* within companies, grant access to financial information, form internal mechanisms for monitoring the activities of employers, and provide *access* to the approval procedure for *strategic projects*. Corporatism is a structure of a social organization in which key economic, social and political decisions are made by joint efforts of corporate groups and the state [Abercrombie, 1997]. With the collapse of the USSR, the Soviet model of social cooperation was transformed, which made the authoritarian model of state-controlled tripartism noncompetitive. According to Russian researcher N. G. Khoroshkevich, to

overcome the deep institutional crisis in the Russian Federation and post-Soviet countries, it is necessary to enhance managerial qualities in the business environment, form a system governed by predictable decisions, start fighting against crime and corruption, establish the rule of law and found institutions that enjoy the trust of the population [Khoroshkevich, 2021]. In this context, we consider it necessary from the perspective of the formation of tripartism in Armenia to emphasize the imperative of its development in cyberspace. This approach is based on the fact that it will not only reduce the populist nature of cyber parties but also clarify their ideological basis, as well as the mechanisms for fulfilling responsibilities in the "struggle for power". In the event of network cooperation, young parties purposefully interact with interest groups to give a more democratic character to the "struggle for power". Experts studying the party activities of countries in the process of democratic transition are of the opinion that as a result of this cooperation, parties turn into new structural units - the so-called extended party networks. The network analysis of collaboration between parties and interest groups is based on two main circumstances: 1) characteristics of the formation of network cooperation between parties and interest groups and 2) network transformations of political parties in conditions of intensive cooperation with interest groups. Currently, the following main factors are identified that affect cooperation between parties and interest groups, as well as the forms and intensity of this cooperation. The first is the process of differentiation and segmentation of interest groups. Second, the role and significance of various types of social splits are diminished. These splits used to make Social Democrats unite with trade unions, large landowners with agricultural unions, and Christian parties with religious organizations. The essence of the third factor is that the growing importance of the role of mass media (especially social networks) contributes to the emergence of new ways of exchanging information and information resources that do not entail a coordinated relationship between parties and interest groups. And the fourth assumes that the chances of political influence of interest groups have increased, as a result of which the latter may not cooperate with parties, struggling with populism "for democracy". The last factor suggests that the cartel model of modern parties and the desire to coordinate intra-party cooperation, as well as the importance of ties between the party and the state, contributed to the division of political society into segments formed by various associations of a relatively independent party and civil society. And the fact that the parties, as agents of state influence, came to the center of criticism, contributed to the weakening of the classical ties between political parties and civil associations.

Hence, the theory of "Extended Party Networks" considers party building and party activity in the context of ties formed around intra-party and extra-party formal structures. In fact, the party today is a network of diverse ties that are used to achieve success in elections and conduct their own policies (both opposition and loyal). The following main participants of network cooperation are distinguished: formal organizational units

of the party, financial donors, supporting activists, campaign organizers, interest groups cooperating with the party, and friendly media. The main issue of these networks is the status of the formal structural units of the party. On the one hand, in such extended party networks, they cannot function outside the interdependence conditions. Based on the analysis of party networks and their coalition nature, M. Grossmann and K. Dominguez note that "party figures... are just representatives of a coalition of strong minorities, performing it in such a way that official committees cannot be the bearers of power without taking into account their interests" [Grossmann, et al., 2009, 771]. On the other hand, in such networks, it is also essential that formal organizations include renowned authoritative leaders who are empowered to enhance cooperation and coordination. Outside the hierarchy, the most important entities can only act informally and indirectly [Koger, et al., 2009, 637]. The obvious proof of the aforementioned is that the network restructuring of parties in Europe has proceeded and is proceeding under conditions of developed tripartism. Network relations in the leading EU countries enable parties in the struggle for power to emphasize public interests and the alternatives that exist in the social network for a mosaic representation of politics. When developing a political agenda, currently European parties first submit it to social networks. In fact, the struggle for power embraced the concept of networking, impacting political campaigns and the political organization of parties. The concept of network political parties becomes more suitable for the analysis of the "rejuvenating" party system in Europe. According to R. Karlsen, the cornerstone of the online strategy of the Norwegian Labour Party was the formation of a thematic network structure aimed at lowering the threshold of participation of party members in party life, as well as the recruitment of new members, which enables to talk about the transition to a network model of the organization [Karlsen, 2013].

Political experience shows that parties, constantly striving for priority status after passing several rounds of elections, complicate the parliamentary work, and such a situation does not contribute to the implementation of one of the most important principles of the democratic order - the evolutionary change of power: For civil society, the most efficient is the performance of those party systems that ensure the comparison of rational parliamentarism (i.e. a sufficient number of parties participating in legislative elections) with the dominant party. Those systems based on a coalition of minority organizations require a flexible and effective allied policy, since with a low assessment of the activities of one of them, the emerging public opinion causes instability of governments.

Consequently, it is also necessary for Armenia to develop solutions to the arisen challenges and to form a new framework of trilateral cooperation, which derives from the performance of the self-proclaimed social state [Constitution of RA, 2005]. Let's consider the realities existing in the social partnership in Armenia. As we have stated, this is also due to the radical transformation of post-Soviet social relations. Linear

liberalization and mechanical Westernization of the Armenian society (in the format of reaching/running modernization) formally formed institutions under which cooperative relations could proceed in line with the logic of tripartism. However, the process of political modernization presupposes not a mechanical reform of public policy, but a targeted modernization of the relationship between the leaders of the traditional ruling elite, the business elite and the trade union (tripartism) that is consistent with the new principles of public administration [Margaryan, 2014, 261]. The efficiency of tripartism is the result of the political will for the state to defend its constitutional obligations and become a guarantor of social relations. The efficiency of tripartism depends on the extent to which the country's business environment is ready to expand the boundaries of social responsibility policies, denying super-profits and monopolies. The formal nature of the trade unions and the lack of stimulating tools both pose significant barriers to the development of tripartism in the Republic of Armenia. Nevertheless, the RA Law "On Trade Unions", adopted by the RA National Assembly on December 5, 2000, was significant in terms of legal regulations. In addition, in 2004, the new Labor Code of the Republic of Armenia regulated collective and individual employment relations, as well as the rights and obligations of the parties. Moreover, on September 24, 2003, Armenia also ratified the "Convention of the International Labour Organization", which regulates the principles of collective bargaining. Article 4 states that to regulate working conditions through concluding collective agreements between employers and employers' organizations, measures should be taken to encourage the process of voluntary negotiations [Hamk.am]. As we can see, there is a sufficient legal-contractual framework both adopted by the RA and commitments assumed under international treaties, so based on this, tripartism can be practically developed in the RA. We think that in order for tripartism to develop in Armenia, both political will on the part of the government and a mandatory interest on the part of the parties concerned in the issue of social responsibility and cooperation is necessary. In the context of the real functioning of tripartism in the Republic of Armenia, firstly, it becomes possible to legitimize the election programs presented by the parties through elections, and citizens can also exercise public control over the activities of the formed coalition government, using the *"citizens' perspective"* approach [Open Government – A Citizen's Perspective, 2018].

It is noteworthy that political scientists M. Lanny and G. Vanberg emphasized the importance of the participation and responsibility degree of the society, based on considerations of managing the result in the process of implementing public policy, in parallel with the activities of coalition governments and party elites [Lanny, 2019, 339]. To solve this task, they developed a mechanism that, in addition to the value of the behavior of the parties that formed the coalition government, emphasized the need to develop and measure the efficiency of the implementation of sectoral policies in parallel with the strengthening of parliamentary institutions and relevant legislative mechanisms. Natural-

ly, the sectoral policy in terms of assessing the efficiency of the coalition government cannot be the only unit of assessment. In this regard, the evaluation criteria primarily take into account the procedures for the adoption of the law on the state budget, discussion on the implementation of the state budget in Parliament, compliance with the principles of security and tripartism with an expanded agenda, written and oral requests to government agencies regarding sectoral issues, etc. In our perspective, in terms of evaluating the efficiency of the coalition government, consistent implementation of public policy is of great importance, especially with the application of the principles of "good governance and social responsibility". According to this perspective, successful democracies have different dimensions of interaction between the legislative and executive branches of government, reflecting modern mechanisms and procedures of parliamentary and public control. Their study and analysis in combination with the institutions and mechanisms operating in the Republic of Armenia can be useful when discussing the possibilities of borrowing them. As key indicators, we propose to consider the procedures for the adoption of the law on the state budget.

In the Republic of Armenia, the procedures for discussing and adopting the draft state budget are established by Articles 110-111 [Constitution of RA, 2015] of Chapter 4 of the Constitution, as well as Articles 87-91 of Chapter 20 of the Rules of Procedure of the National Assembly, Constitutional Law [«Rules of procedure of the National Assembly» the Constitutional Law, 2016]. The latter, within the framework of the discussion of the draft law on the state budget, establishes such important provisions as 1) "Preliminary debates of the draft take place at sittings and joint sittings of the standing committees, by the established procedure of which, members of the Government and persons authorized by the Prime Minister as well as other persons indicated in the schedule also participate in it", 2) "The right to take the floor with a co-report during the debate of the draft in the National Assembly, except for the head committee, belongs to the representatives of other standing committees if the draft was previously debated in those committees and there is the conclusion of the committee about it", 3) "The right to submit written proposals by a result of preliminary debates of the draft state budget belongs to the Deputies and factions". These provisions are decisive in terms of organizing the procedures for discussing and adopting the draft law on the State budget. However, a systematic analysis shows that in the context of the deterrence and counterbalance of the legislative and executive branches of government, we are actually dealing with the dominant position of the executive branch over the parliament. This phenomenon, firstly, contradicts the principles of parliamentary government, in addition, it is unacceptable from the point of view of separation of branches of government and independence. Thus, the provision established by Paragraph 2 of Article 89 of the RA Constitutional Law, "Rules of Procedure of the National Assembly" actually guarantees the arbitrary attitude of the government regarding the acceptance of objections or proposals

submitted by factions or deputies. "The Government, after the expiry of the deadline for the submission of written proposals, may submit the draft for a debate to the National Assembly without change, either by elaborating it on its own initiative, or on the basis of written proposals."

Moreover, both the Constitution and the Rules of Procedure of the National Assembly, Constitutional Law, do not provide for the cases and consequences of the Parliament's failure to adopt the draft law on the state budget. As for the study and analysis of the procedures for discussing and adopting the draft law on the state budget, we can conclude that the existing legislative and constitutional regulations are incomplete and do not establish efficient mechanisms of restraint and counterbalance of the executive power.

Based on the principles of the parliamentary system of governance, the factions should participate in the decision-making process on the necessary information related to security and defense issues and coordinate work with the public to avoid various risks (the formation of dividing lines between the RA and AR societies). The above-mentioned is important both for the consolidation of work and elimination of the "super-prime minister" system of administration, as well as in the process of transition to parliamentary democracy.

In almost all parliamentary countries, the parliament has real levers to counterbalance the executive power and control its activities. In the Federal Republic of Germany, the Government cannot spend a single cent of the state budget without the knowledge and approval of the Bundestag deputies. Although parliamentary commissions play a crucial role from this perspective, deputies should also be able to request and receive complete information on matters that are important to them, fully exercising their constitutional rights.

The rights of the members of the parliament are restricted in terms of being fully informed about Armenia's foreign policy priorities, security, and military spending. It is significant that in this case the rights of deputies to vote should also be restricted since a deputy must not participate in voting on such important bills about which he does not have complete information. Therefore, it is important to ensure that deputies are informed according to the extent of state and official secrets in order to improve the institutions of the deputy and parliament, rather than restricting the ability to vote.

Conclusion Based on the aforementioned, we conclude that parliamentary control is of paramount importance in terms of the coalition government's responsibility. The quality of government activity, as well as the axiology of the Concept of Public Policy, is largely due to the actual use of models of restraint of the legislative and executive branches of government. In this section of the work, the activities of tripartist actors in

the Republic of Armenia were considered, based on the level of formation of parliamentary institutions and the deputies' awareness of public interests. In this context, it should be noted that the legislative behavior of deputies is differentiated in accordance with political culture, the value of exercising power and the ability to conduct an authentical discourse. The joint manifestation of these phenomena, simultaneously forming two social (public) and political (parliamentary) realities, formalizes discourse and communication function, which periodically raises the desire to *dispose of sensory hunger* in a marginalized society. The reason is the lack of a security system with an expanded agenda, which not only leads to emphasized marginalization and alienation of the society but there is also an escape from a fake reality – emigration.

The problem is that so far the process of consolidation from the democratic transition in Armenia does not include evolutionary convergence of public interests. Meanwhile, the best theorists of the democratic transition Linz J. and Stepan A. claim that it is precisely such convergence that enables to make such a theoretical generalization: "If a functioning state exists, five other interconnected and mutually reinforcing conditions must also exist or be crafted for a democracy to be consolidated. First, the conditions must exist for the development of a free and lively civil society. Second, there must be a relatively autonomous and valued political society. Third, there must be a rule of law to ensure legal guarantees for citizens' freedom and independent associational life. Fourth, there must be a state bureaucracy that is usable by the new democratic government. Fifth, there must be an institutionalized economic society." [Linz & Stepan, 1996, 7] Based on the approaches of the best theorists on the democratic transition Linz J. and Stepan A., we want to add that only transitions containing linear liberalization in post-Soviet countries overlooked the factor of relations between political and civil societies. The following approach is noteworthy in this regard:

"The political elite, assigning a priority to the institutional formation of civil society and cooperation with it, with the help of the institutions of this society, implemented a democratic transition with the model of running modernization without consolidation exit, overlooking the problem of the functional formation of political society. Meanwhile, by political society we mean the sphere where society intentionally organizes itself to justify its right of exercising control over society and the state apparatus" [Margaryan, et al., 2021, 24]. From the point of view discussed, it is also noteworthy that, analyzing the process of democratization of Latin American countries, L Avritser presents democratization primarily as a means of socio-political self-organization [Avritser, 2002, 3-10]. As such, it guarantees the fundamental human rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution and includes the public demand for the accountability of the authorities in the agenda of public discourse. L. Avritser calls this method of socio-political self-organization a political and public space. At the same time, L.

Avritser is convinced that democratization is an organized political competition between public administration institutions and non-government organizations. According to the author, this model of democratization assumes a political society dominated by group interactions. Based on L. Arvitser's observation, in the event of a violation of the balance between these two levels, democracy loses its viability. Furthermore, democratization may not succeed if participatory politics are not consistently used throughout the multi-level process. Rejecting public participation only in electoral processes, L. Avritzer uses the term "democratic elitism", convinced that the reduction of electoral fraud is a relative success if the political elite conducts an isolated and manipulative policy towards citizens in the interim between elections. All this more than deepens the alienation of society from reality and manipulates its consciousness hindering the process of natural modernization of public space and the formation of a political society. To prevent and manage these negative manifestations, we suggest using the Facebook social network, and digital and traditional media to develop a discourse between citizens and responsible actors of tripartist politics. This will reduce the manipulation of PR (public relations) and GR (government relations) technologies, as well as expand communication with the public based on feedback through the parallel application of PR and GR technologies. However, the recent socio-political developments in Armenia following the 44-day war indicate that politicians use PR-GR technologies not to conduct a real discourse with society, but to present their rating in a new light. Electronic media platforms and the Facebook social network play a decisive role in this matter.

The process of recent political developments in Armenia is characterized by:

1) Alienation of political figures and political parties from reality, that is, the content of the information broadcast by mass media under their control, having the nature of serving personal or group interest, manipulates public consciousness. Meanwhile, in the conditions of parliamentary governance, the discourse between the deputy and the electorate ought to be of utmost importance, through which the politician simultaneously enhances his knowledge of political communication, socializing and legitimizing his personality.

2) On Facebook and other social networks, false agendas are formed by fake users. In Armenia, the use of "rumorology" from latent tools of political marketing, which spreads information and communication through rumors or gossip, has been particularly developed and is developing [Zheltukhina, et al., 2016, 10587]. In this situation, politicians can construct values that they can use to manipulate and marginalize people's consciousness while evading responsibility by exploiting media resources in social networks. Meanwhile, the latter, being the bearer of the historical experience of the individual, society, and nation, is considered one of the most essential components of the system of social conditions of political development. Consequently, we can come to the following conclusions:

1. Armenia, which is experiencing a crisis of political development, can execute the process of natural modernization, cleansing the political system of marginality and alienation only through competitive cadres ("smart power") bearing an internal (indogenic) system of values. And in this instance, the coalition government will be able to implement a democratic transition to consolidation. This is the only way to ensure the stability of the political system and security with an expanded agenda.

2. The parliamentary elite, in line with responding to challenges, is obliged to make its activities and knowledge competitive. This will enable the parliamentary forces to develop a discourse based on the principles of cooperation culture based on a compromise policy of national solidarity and mutual security.

3. All parliamentary forces ought to conduct civic education addressed to all age groups of the society. Due to the development of manipulative technologies for exercising power, modern Armenian society is not released from the image of homo-sovietikus [Homo sovieticus, 2005, 186]. Moreover, the marginal and alienated masses formally participate in the processes of political development. And the political elite, in collaboration with the business elite, not only did not assume responsibility for the struggle against the monopoly on superprofits, having survived the crises of political development but also built a mutually coordinated oligarchy.

4. The formation of tripartism in the Republic of Armenia through multidimensional discourse is a decisive factor in the development of the responsibility of the ruling (legislative, executive), business elites and trade unions for the natural modernization of public interest.

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Issues of Increasing the Responsibility of Parliamentary Governance of the Republic of Armenia: Tripartism

The article discusses the necessity to increase the management of the outcome of the process from democratic transition to consolidation. To this end, with the help of a synergetic and functional-structuralist methodology, the mechanisms of parliamentary control and increasing socio-political responsibility in the countries of democratic transition have been identified. According to the authors, to overcome the marginality derived in the process of the democratic transition, it is necessary to increase the culture of exercising power, emphasizing the priority component of managing the outcome of social responsibility. In this context, the political and economic foundations of tripartism are introduced, which enabled the authors to reveal the cooperation of the ruling elite, the business elite and the trade unions. There is a justified opinion that the process from democratic transition to consolidation has a formal nature if the policy of tripartism is not applied, and the coalition government does not disclose socio-ethno-cultural features of the exercise of power. Through this approach, it has been proved that the new waves of innovation and digitization of information and communication technologies have radically changed and will still change the institutional foundations of management and the value system of managing the working environment. According to the authors, new technological progress and transforming socio-political relations have created new challenges for regular modernization. The latter can be resisted if the socio-political discourse from the democratic transition to consolidation is made public. To this end, it is proposed to create a special platform in Armenia for discussing issues of public interest. Provide all interested participants with the opportunity to participate in the discourse to present and support their viewpoints on this platform.