

CENTRAL BANKS, SYSTEMIC RISK, AND THE EVOLUTION OF MODERN BANKING: CHALLENGES AND ALTERNATIVES

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Introduction

Modern banking systems predominantly operate under the principle of fractional reserve banking, a framework in which commercial banks are required to hold only a fraction of deposits as reserves, while lending out the remainder to borrowers. This mechanism has enabled significant credit expansion and economic growth by multiplying the effects of an initial deposit across the banking system. At the same time, it has also introduced systemic vulnerabilities, including liquidity shortages and the potential for financial instability [Mishkin, 2022, 314].

Central banks occupy a pivotal position within this framework. Through instruments such as reserve requirements, policy interest rates, and open market operations, they regulate the money supply and influence the cost and availability of credit. In addition to these conventional tools, the last decades have seen the increasing use of unconventional measures - quantitative easing, forward guidance, and targeted lending facilities - that have reshaped the role of monetary authorities in stabilizing modern economies [Blinder, 2023, 107]. The purpose of this paper is to examine the origins, mechanisms, and consequences of fractional reserve banking. Specifically, it explores:

- The historical development of fractional reserve banking.
- How commercial banks create money and manage reserves.
- The interaction of central bank policies with credit expansion.
- The major benefits and risks associated with the system.
- The disruptive role of cryptocurrencies and blockchain in rethinking financial intermediation.
- Proposed reforms and future perspectives for the banking sector.

By combining historical analysis, theoretical models, and contemporary case studies, the study seeks to provide a balanced understanding of both the strengths and weaknesses of this system, and to assess how ongoing reforms may shape the future.

Methodology

This study employs a qualitative and analytical methodology based on a comprehensive review of historical records, theoretical frameworks, empirical case studies, and existing

literature on central banking and fractional reserve banking. The approach is structured as follows:

Historical Analysis: Tracing the evolution of fractional reserve banking from medieval Europe to contemporary central banking, with focus on regulatory responses to systemic risks, including deposit insurance, reserve requirements, and lender-of-last-resort mechanisms. This step contextualizes the historical development and institutional foundations of modern banking.

Theoretical Framework: Reviewing economic models relevant to banking operations and systemic risk, including the money multiplier effect and bank run models, providing a conceptual basis to interpret the mechanics, vulnerabilities, and stabilizing interventions in banking systems.

Case Study Examination: Analyzing major crises – including the 2008 global financial crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic, and Eurozone sovereign debt shocks – drawing on central bank reports and scholarly studies. This step demonstrates how central banks respond to systemic stress.

Literature Review: Synthesizing research on central bank policies, unconventional monetary tools, and alternative banking models. This allows identification of trends, debates, and proposed reforms.

Comparative Analysis: Evaluating alternatives to fractional reserve banking, such as full-reserve, narrow banking, CBDCs, and decentralized finance (DeFi), assessing their benefits, limitations, and implications for systemic stability.

Synthesis and interpretation: Integrating historical, theoretical, and empirical insights to assess the resilience, vulnerabilities, and future prospects of modern banking systems, emphasizing the evolving role of central banks in mitigating systemic risk.

This methodology ensures that conclusions are evidence-based, holistic, and applicable to contemporary discussions on banking stability, monetary policy, and financial innovation.

Literature Review

Academic discourse on fractional reserve banking spans a spectrum from rigorous critique to cautious endorsement. Rothbard (2008) characterizes the system as structurally unstable and ethically questionable, arguing that lending beyond reserves undermines depositor trust and historically precipitated recurrent financial crises. He advocates a full-reserve banking model to eliminate these vulnerabilities. In contrast, Friedman (1960) acknowledges such risks but emphasizes the efficiency of fractional reserve banking in facilitating credit creation and economic growth, advocating for calibrated regulatory interventions rather than outright abolition. Bagehot (1873) provides a historical lens on central banking as a stabilizing force, demonstrating how lenders of last resort can mitigate liquidity shocks and preserve confidence in deposit-based systems. Formal theoretical frameworks, such as the Diamond–Dybvig model (1983), illustrate that liquidity

transformation inherently creates multiple-equilibrium scenarios, exposing banks to the risk of runs, while deposit insurance mechanisms can stabilize expectations and avert systemic collapse. Contemporary analyses, including Mishkin (2022), integrate these insights into modern monetary policy discussions, highlighting how central bank interventions mediate the delicate balance between credit expansion and systemic stability. While previous contributions often focus on either the benefits or the vulnerabilities of fractional reserve banking, this study adopts a holistic approach by synthesizing historical, theoretical, and empirical perspectives. It further examines how innovations such as cryptocurrencies, blockchain, and CBDCs challenge conventional money creation and intermediation frameworks. By integrating these perspectives, the article situates fractional reserve banking within the broader context of financial innovation and systemic risk, while identifying potential reform pathways that enhance stability without unduly constraining credit creation and economic growth.

Scientific novelty

This article contributes to the literature by providing a nuanced and balanced perspective on fractional reserve banking, a subject often portrayed in extreme criticism or unwavering defense. Unlike conventional studies, it simultaneously emphasizes the system's capacity for credit creation, economic growth, and efficient financial intermediation, while also highlighting its inherent vulnerabilities, including systemic risk and moral hazard.

The paper integrates historical evolution, a comparative analysis of U.S. and Eurozone central bank policies, and emerging technological developments, including cryptocurrencies, blockchain, and central bank digital currencies (CBDCs). By combining these dimensions, the study offers a comprehensive understanding of the trade-offs between financial dynamism and systemic fragility, delivering insights relevant to policymakers, researchers, and stakeholders exploring sustainable alternatives to modern banking.

Analysis

Historical origins of fractional reserve banking: Fractional reserve banking emerged in medieval Europe, when goldsmiths accepted precious metals for safekeeping and issued transferable receipts to depositors. Since not all depositors withdrew their holdings at the same time, goldsmiths realized they could lend out a portion of these reserves, charging interest and thereby laying the foundations of credit intermediation [Rothbard, 2008, 45].

The institutionalization of this practice marked a turning point in economic history. The establishment of the Bank of England in 1694 provided a central institution capable of issuing banknotes, regulating reserves, and serving as a lender of last resort during liquidity shortages [Bagehot, 1873, 75]. In the United States, the fragmented banking system of the 19th century gave way to a more integrated model with the National Banking Acts and, ultimately, the creation of the Federal Reserve in 1913, which consolidated and stabilized the system. Historical crises revealed both the strengths and weaknesses of

fractional reserve banking. The Great Depression of 1929 exposed the fragility of banks subject to sudden runs, as the collapse of depositor confidence triggered widespread insolvency. In response, deposit insurance schemes and stricter regulations were introduced, fundamentally reshaping the banking landscape [Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), 2024, 22]. Later episodes, such as the Savings and Loan crisis of the 1980s, reinforced the importance of prudent oversight and adaptive regulation [Mishkin, 2022, 318]. More recent crises, including the 2008 financial collapse and the COVID-19 shock of 2020, further demonstrated the continuing relevance of central bank intervention in safeguarding stability.

The mechanics of fractional reserve banking: At its core, fractional reserve banking allows commercial banks to hold only a portion of deposits as reserves, either in the form of vault cash or deposits with the central bank, while lending out the remainder. This process generates new money through what is known as the money multiplier effect [Samuelson & Nordhaus, 2020, 426]. For example, with a reserve ratio of 10%, a deposit of \$1,000 enables a bank to lend \$900. Once this \$900 is spent and redeposited in another bank, that bank may lend 90% of it again, creating a self-reinforcing cycle of credit expansion [Cecchetti & Schoenholtz, 2021, 112]. Over successive rounds, the banking system transforms an initial deposit into a significantly larger amount of money circulating in the economy. Different categories of deposits are subject to varying requirements. Demand deposits, which can be withdrawn at any moment, typically require higher reserves than time deposits, which are less liquid. By adjusting reserve requirements, central banks directly influence the capacity of banks to create credit. More broadly, the mechanism of fractional reserves demonstrates how commercial banks act not merely as intermediaries of savings, but as active creators of money.

Role of central banks in modern economies: Central banks are entrusted with the dual mandate of maintaining monetary stability and safeguarding financial systems. As lenders of last resort, they provide liquidity to banks during crises, thereby preventing localized failures from escalating into systemic collapse [Borio & Disyatat, 2010, 15; Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, 2015, 18]. Key instruments of monetary control include:

- Open market operations: the buying and selling of government securities to adjust the level of bank reserves.
- Policy interest rates: benchmark rates that guide short-term borrowing costs and influence wider credit conditions.
- Reserve requirements: mandated minimums of deposits to be held as reserves.
- Unconventional tools: quantitative easing, forward guidance, and emergency liquidity facilities, increasingly deployed since the 2008 crisis [ECB, 2024, 58].

Beyond monetary policy, central banks also supervise financial institutions, implement macroprudential policies, and coordinate with international regulatory frameworks [Cec-

chetti, Mohanty, & Zampolli, 2010, 12]. Their interventions during crises, such as the 2008 global financial meltdown and the COVID-19 shock, highlight their indispensable role in preventing economic collapse and restoring confidence [Gorton, 2010, 328].

Benefits of fractional reserve banking: Fractional reserve banking contributes to economic development in several important ways:

1. Credit expansion – Banks can extend loans that multiply the availability of funds, stimulating investment and consumption [Friedman, 1960, 35].
2. Efficient capital allocation – Credit can be directed toward productive enterprises, enabling innovation and growth.
3. Liquidity management – Reserve requirements balance the need for depositor withdrawals with the maximization of lending potential.

Under effective regulatory and supervisory frameworks, fractional reserve banking has supported the long-term expansion of both advanced and emerging economies [Mishkin, 2022, 321]. The system's ability to create money endogenously has been one of the key drivers of modern economic dynamism.

Risks and vulnerabilities: Despite these advantages, fractional reserve banking carries inherent risks that have repeatedly manifested throughout history:

- Liquidity risk: Sudden mass withdrawals may trigger bank runs [Diamond & Dybvig, 1983, 402].
- Systemic risk: Interconnectedness means the failure of one bank can propagate to others, creating contagion.
- Moral hazard: The expectation of central bank bailouts may incentivize excessive risk-taking [Admati & Hellwig, 2013, 112].
- Financial crises: The 2007–2008 global crisis revealed how complex financial instruments, such as mortgage-backed securities, can amplify vulnerabilities [Gorton, 2010].

Effective oversight, credible deposit insurance, and macroprudential safeguards are essential to mitigating these risks. Nonetheless, the potential for instability remains a defining feature of the system.

Theoretical models and empirical evidence Theoretical and empirical literature has provided significant insights into the functioning of fractional reserve banking:

- Diamond–Dybvig model (1983): Demonstrates that bank runs can be explained as multiple-equilibrium phenomena – deposit insurance serving as a stabilizing mechanism.
- Macroeconomic simulations: Suggest that higher reserve ratios reduce credit creation but improve systemic stability [Cecchetti, Mohanty, & Zampolli, 2010, 18].
- Empirical studies: Show that central banks face a delicate balance between promoting credit growth and containing systemic risk [Admati & Hellwig, 2013, 112].

Case studies such as the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis of 2010 and the Federal Reserve's quantitative easing programs between 2008 and 2014 illustrate how central bank policies can stabilize economies while influencing the dynamics of credit and money supply [ECB, 2024, 60].

Reform proposals and alternatives: Given its vulnerabilities, several reform proposals have emerged over the years:

1. 100% reserve banking: Requires banks to hold reserves equal to all deposits, virtually eliminating bank-run risk but severely constraining credit creation [Friedman, 1960, 35].
2. Narrow banking: Separates payments and deposit services from riskier lending operations, minimizing systemic exposure [Kay, 2009, 22].
3. Central bank digital currencies (CBDCs): Offer individuals and businesses direct access to central bank liabilities, potentially reshaping the role of commercial banks [Cecchetti et al., 2010, 18].
4. Macroprudential regulation: Includes stress testing, liquidity coverage ratios, and countercyclical capital buffers designed to reduce procyclical risks.

The debate over these alternatives reflects the tension between credit efficiency and systemic safety, especially in an increasingly digital and globalized financial system.

Cryptocurrencies, blockchain, and the future of banking: In addition to formal reform proposals, the rapid rise of cryptocurrencies and blockchain-based systems has opened a new frontier in the debate on the future of fractional reserve banking. Cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin and Ethereum emerged in part as a reaction to the vulnerabilities of the traditional banking system, especially after the 2008 global financial crisis [Zhang et al., 2023, 108]. Their architecture – based on decentralized networks, consensus algorithms, and cryptographic verification – eliminates the need for centralized intermediaries, offering a model of money not directly linked to commercial banks' credit creation process.

The implications for fractional reserve banking are significant. While bank money is inherently elastic, expanding and contracting with credit creation, most cryptocurrencies have rigid or predetermined supply rules (e.g., Bitcoin's 21 million caps). This contrast has fueled debates on whether blockchain-based assets could serve as a hedge against inflationary policies and systemic crises. However, their extreme volatility, scalability challenges, and limited adoption as everyday payment methods suggest they are unlikely to replace national currencies in the near future [Zhang et al., 2023, 108].

More important than the currencies themselves is the underlying blockchain technology, which enables transparent, immutable, and decentralized record-keeping. Decentralized finance (DeFi) platforms already replicate core banking activities – such as lending, borrowing, and derivatives trading—without traditional intermediaries. Although DeFi is still experimental and subject to significant risks (technological failures, lack of regula-

tion, and market manipulation), it highlights the possibility of an alternative system where financial intermediation is disintermediated, reducing reliance on fractional reserves and central bank backstops.

Central banks have responded to these developments by accelerating research into central bank digital currencies (CBDCs). A CBDC would preserve sovereign control over monetary policy while adopting some technological advantages of blockchain, such as programmability, security, and efficiency in payment systems. Pilot projects – including China’s e-CNY, Sweden’s e-krona, and the European Central Bank’s digital euro initiative – illustrate how CBDCs could transform the relationship between the public, banks, and central banks. Their introduction could reduce dependence on commercial bank deposits for everyday payments, thereby diminishing the centrality of fractional reserve banking in money creation [Cecchetti et al., 2010, 18].

In this sense, cryptocurrencies and blockchain do not merely compete with traditional banking but act as catalysts for institutional innovation. By challenging the dominance of commercial banks in money creation and payment infrastructures, they push central banks and regulators to rethink the very architecture of the monetary system. Over the next decade, we are likely to witness a coexistence of models: traditional fractional reserve banking, evolving under tighter macroprudential oversight; private blockchain-based finance, with its opportunities and vulnerabilities; and state-backed CBDCs, seeking to balance innovation with stability.

Case studies on crisis management: Historical records provide several illustrations of how central banks and banking systems have responded to crises under fractional reserve banking:

- *2008 Financial Crisis:* Central banks injected liquidity, lowered interest rates, and implemented quantitative easing to stabilize the banking system [Gorton, 2010, 328]. These interventions highlighted the fragility of securitized assets and the decisive role of central banks in restoring confidence.
- *COVID-19 Pandemic:* The Federal Reserve and the ECB provided emergency lending and large-scale asset purchase programs, preventing the collapse of credit markets and ensuring continued economic activity despite unprecedented disruptions [European Central Bank, 2024, 60]. During this period, the parallel growth of crypto assets became significant, with Bitcoin and stablecoins increasingly adopted by investors seeking alternatives to fiat-based systems.
- *Emerging Markets:* Reserve requirements are often higher (10–20%) to maintain stability, reflecting different risk profiles compared to advanced economies [Mishkin, 2022, 316; Bank of Canada, 2025, 12]. Simultaneously, the adoption of blockchain-based payment systems in countries with fragile banking infrastructures indicates how alternative models may serve as “shadow stabilizers” when traditional finance is under stress.

These examples illustrate the central role of banks and central banks in promoting growth and containing crises, while also showing how new financial technologies are increasingly present as parallel instruments during periods of systemic stress.

Conclusions

Fractional reserve banking has historically been a cornerstone of modern financial systems, enabling credit creation and economic growth while exposing banks and the broader economy to liquidity and systemic risks. Central banks, as regulators and lenders of last resort, have traditionally played a key role in mitigating these risks through reserve requirements, interest rate policies, and emergency interventions [Blinder, 2023, 107; Borio & Disyatat, 2010, 15].

Recent developments illustrate how flexible and adaptive central bank policies have become in response to evolving financial realities. In the United States, for example, the Federal Reserve eliminated reserve requirements on March 26, 2020, setting the ratio for all net transaction accounts to 0% [Federal Reserve, 2020, 2]. This unprecedented move reflects the central bank's confidence in modern liquidity management mechanisms and supervisory frameworks, allowing banks to operate without traditional minimum reserves.

In contrast, in the Eurozone, the European Central Bank (ECB) continues to maintain a minimum reserve requirement of 1% on key liabilities, such as customer deposits and short-term debt securities, which are held at national central banks [European Central Bank, 2024, 58]. The ECB's approach balances liquidity provision with the need to influence money supply, credit creation across a harmonized multi-country monetary area.

The rise of blockchain and cryptocurrencies adds an additional dimension: by enabling peer-to-peer transfers without intermediaries, these technologies challenge the assumption that fractional reserve banking is indispensable for modern economies. DeFi platforms and stablecoins demonstrate the possibility of parallel financial ecosystems, operating with different logics of trust, transparency, and risk management.

Different central bank strategies highlight that the underlying principle remains: acting as the ultimate safeguard against systemic risk while shaping the capacity of commercial banks to create credit. The U.S. move to zero reserve requirements shows that modern banking systems can maintain stability even without rigid reserve ratios, provided there is robust oversight and stress-testing. The ECB's minimum reserve approach reflects a more traditional but cautious method, controlling liquidity and supporting macroeconomic objectives.

In summary:

- Reserve requirements remain a crucial but flexible tool.
- Policy divergence reflects structural differences in banking systems.
- Fractional reserve banking remains inherently fragile, requiring constant intervention.

- Blockchain and decentralized finance introduce potential alternatives, reducing reliance on credit creation and bailouts.

Fractional reserve banking thus represents both an engine of growth and a structural vulnerability. The recurring use of deposit insurance, quantitative easing, and emergency liquidity facilities indicates that it is not inherently stable but constantly stabilized through intervention. The future will depend on whether policymakers and societies continue to accept the trade-off between economic dynamism and systemic fragility, or whether the search for stability and transparency will demand a fundamental transformation of the contemporary monetary order.

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Central banks, systemic risk, and the evolution of modern banking: challenges and alternatives

Key words: central bank, systemic risk, banking system, financial stability, money supply, crypto currency

This article investigates the role of central banks and the functioning of the fractional reserve banking system, providing a comprehensive evaluation of its advantages, limitations, and potential alternatives. It begins with a historical overview, tracing the emergence of banking institutions and the development of reserve requirements as regulatory tools to balance liquidity and financial stability, clarifying how the system evolved into its current form with interdependence among commercial banks, financial markets, and central bank oversight. The analysis details money creation via deposit multiplication and lending, emphasizing commercial banks' role as creators of credit and liquidity. It examines central bank policies – policy rates, open market operations, and unconventional measures such as quantitative easing – and their effects on money supply, business cycles, credit, and inflation. Critical vulnerabilities, including financial instability, bank runs, and contagion, are highlighted, with empirical evidence showing ongoing risks. Broader implications include debt amplification, inequality, and global financial imbalances. The paper explores reforms such as 100% reserve banking, narrow banking, CBDCs, and blockchain-based alternatives, evaluating their potential to enhance transparency, reduce systemic risks, and support macrofinancial stability while noting trade-offs in credit efficiency and economic growth. The study offers a balanced perspective on the sustainability of the fractional reserve model.